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CURRENT DECISIONS
Domestic Relations-STmENGn OF PREsT IoNs IN MAuuc. In
DeRyder v. Metropolitan Life Insrance Company' the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia raised a strong presumption in favor of the
validity of a second marriage and held that plaintiff's evidence was not
sufficient to rebut this presumption.
Plaintiff, the first wife of deceased, filed suit to recover on a life
insurance policy, alleging wrongful payment by defendant life insur-
ance company to a second wife. The evidence showed that plaintiff
had consummated a valid marriage with deceased, who deserted her
and subsequently married a second wife. The Circuit Court of the City
of Hampton granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that plaintiff had not met the burden of proving that the first
marriage had remained undissolved.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, relying upon an earlier Virginia
case, affirmed. The Court stated that in deciding the question of
whether or not a divorce had been obtained, the party attacking the
second marriage has the burden of proving that the first marriage was
valid and that it had not been dissolved.
In reaching this decision the Court encounters a conflict of authority
over the question of whether a divorce can be presumed to have been
obtained by a person who subsequently remarries. A substantial major-
ity of the courts which have decided this issue raised a presumption in
favor of the validity of the second marriage 8 even though this pre-
1. 206 Va. 602, 145 S.E.2d 177 (1965).
2. Parker v. American Lumber Corporation, 190 Va. 181, 56 S.E.2d 214 (1949). The
second wife of deceased, Hezekiah Parker, claimed recovery under Workman's Com-
pensation as his lawful widow, but she was denied recovery because of a prior
marriage of deceased. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed this decision and allowed
the second wife to share recovery with two minor children of the first marriage on
the grounds that the first wife had not rebutted the presumption in favor of the
validity of the second marriage. The first wife had remarried, but she alleged that she
had not gotten a divorce and had not received notice of a divorce proceeding. The
case stated that:
The decided weight of authority and we think the correct view is that where
two marriages of the same person are shown, the second is presumed to be valid,
... so that the person who attacks a second marriage has the burden of pro-
ducing evidence of its invalidity. Where both parties to the first marriage are
shown to be living at the time of the second marriage, it is presumed in favor
of the second marriage that the first was dissolved by divorce. These presumptions
arise, it is said, because the law presumed morality and legitimacy, not immorality
and bastardy.
S. Smith v. Smith, 169 Or. 650, 131 P. 2d 447 (1942); Whitman v. Whitman, 206
Miss. 838, 41 So. 2d 22 (1949); Pilcher v. Pilcher, 141 Utah 72, 197 P.2d 143 (1948);
Holman v. Holman, Tex. Comm. App., 288 S.W. 413 (1926); Pittinger v. Pittinger, 28
Colo. 308, 64 Pac. 195 (1901).
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sumption conflicts directly with another, i.e. that once a valid marriage
is proven it is presumed to continue. The weight of authority holds that
when these two presumptions conflict, that in favor of the validity of
the second marriage is considered to be the stronger.4 In Smith v. Smith9
the Oregon Supreme Court stated that the presumption in favor of the
validity of a second marriage is one of the strongest disputable pre-
sumptions known to law. However strong some courts have held this
presumption to be, it is not conclusive and may be overcome by clear
evidence that the first marriage was not dissolved."
The minority viewpoint is based on the theory that no valid second
marriage can be presumed unless the first marriage is shown to have
been dissolved. In Iowa the courts have long refused to raise a pre-
sumption of the validity of the second marriage in the absence of some
facts to prove its legitimacy. 7 The presumption itself was recognized
in the Iowa courts, but the application was strictly limited. On the
other hand, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to raise the
presumption in the case of Williams v. Williams s where the second
wife was held to have the burden of establishing the validity of her
marriage.
Where the courts raise the presumption in favor of the validity of a
second marriage a conflict arises over the sufficiency of evidence neces-
sary to rebut this presumption. This is normally held to be a question
of fact which must be decided on a case to case basis. Nearly all
jurisdictions would agree that mere proof of a former valid marriage
4. Shreyer v. Shreyer, 113 Colo. 219, 155 P. 2d 990 (1945); Massenga v. Rosso, 87 Cal.
App. 2d 790, 197 P. 2d 770 (1948); Doertch v. Folwell Engineering Company, 252 Mich.
76, 233 N.W. 211 (1930).
5. Supra, note 4.
6. Gainery v. Fleming, 279 F. 2d 56 (1960); Batts v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 26
(1954); Dorsey v. Dorsey, 259 Ala. 220, 66 So. 2d 135 (1953); Quinn v. Miles, Fla, 124
So. 2d 883 (1960).
7. Ellis v. Ellis, 58 Iowa 720, 13 N.W. 65 (1882) (It was held that there must be
facts to show the first marriage ended before the presumption would be raised.);
Gilman v. Sheets, 78 Iowa 499, 43 N.W. 299 (1889) (Court held that the conduct of
both spouses would have to be inconsistent with the marriage to raise the presumption.);
Contra: Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Iowa 228, 22 Am. Rep. 245 (1876) (Court raised
the presumption where both parties subsequently remarried.); Farr v. Farr, 190 Iowa
1005, 181 N.W. 268 (1921) (In an annulment proceeding the court held the presumption
valid and the husband would have to show that the former marriage was not dis-
solved.).
8. 254 N.C. 729, 120 S.E. 2d 68 (1961). (In this case the second wife was a voluntary
intervenor in the suit which the Court interpreted as putting the burden of proof on
her to show that her husband, the defendant, had obtained a divorce from his first
wife before marrying the second wife.).
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is not sufficient to rebut the presumption.9 On the other hand, where
there is evidence to show that no divorce proceedings were completed
in any of the jurisdictions where either party lived, it is usually held that
this would amount to almost plenary proof that the marriage had not
been dissolved.' 0 Between these two extremes the conflict arises over
what factors should be weighed most heavily to uphold or rebut the
presumption."
The present case, while following the majority rule in raising the
presumption in favor of the validity of a second marriage, extended
the Virginia rule concerning the sufficiency of evidence necessary to re-
but the presumption. 12 This case held that a strong presumption in favor
of the validity of the second marriage could only be rebutted by proving
that no divorce had been recorded anywhere that either spouse had
been domiciled. 13 While the Court in practice requires this strong evi-
dence to rebut the presumption, the language laid down in the opinion
implies the use of a more lenient attitude with respect to the require-
ment of evidence necessary to rebut this presumption. The Court states
that:
... (T)he one contending against the legality of the second marriage
is not required to make plenary proof of a negative averment. It is
enough that he introduce such evidence as in the absence of all
counter testimony, will afford reasonable grounds for presuming the
allegation is true .... 14
9. Pittinger v. Pittinger, supra, note 4; New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Seals,
55 Ga. App. 569, 190 S.E. 870 (1937).
10. Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okla. 249, 204 Pac. 284 (1921) (Although
a divorce proceeding had been started, none was completed in any of the counties
where either the first wife or her husband wre domiciled. This rebutted the pre-
sumption in favor of the validity of the second marriage.).
11. Cole v. Cole, 153 Ill. 585, 38 N.E. 703 (1894) (The presumption was held rebutted
where the first wife remained faithful, gave no grounds for divorce or desertion, and
had no knowledge o! divorce proceedings against her, and none were instituted in
the state where she lived.); Travelers Insurance Company v. Lester, 173 Ga. App. 465, 36
S.E.2d 880 (1946) (Presumption held rebutted where both parties recognized the con-
tinued existence of the relationship, as evidenced by the husband's return to the
first wife from time to time, and his continued support of her.); Hale v. Hale, 40
Okla. 101, 135 Pac. 1143 (1913) (Presumption upheld where there was no evidence of
divorce proceedings in certain counties where deceased lived, but no proof that these
were the only counties where deceased could have gotten a divorce.).
12. Parker v. American Lumber Corporation, 190 Va. 181, 56 S.E.2d 214.
13. DeRyder v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 206 Va. at 609, 145 S.E.2d at 182.
14. Id. at 608, 145 S.E. 2d at 181.
Also: Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, supra note 11, 204 Pac. at 287.
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The Supreme Court of Appeals should continue to uphold the valid-
ity of a second marriage in the absence of strong evidence that a prior
marriage had not been dissolved, but in so doing the Court should use
language which would be consistent with the actual standard of evi-
dence required to rebut this presumption.
Joseph Howard
Procedure-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-EFFECT OF NONRESIDENT
MOTORIST SERVICE ON TOLLING PROVISIONS. In Bergman v. Turpin,'
Mitchell E. Bergman, plaintiff, and Iford L. Turpin, defendant, were
involved in an automobile accident in Botetourt County, Virginia on
May 30, 1959, whereby-the plaintiff sustained personal injuries. At the
time of the accident the defendant was a resident of Virginia but shortly
thereafter, on November 1, 1959 he became a resident of the District
of Columbia. The plaintiff was, at all times pertinent to the controversy,
a resident of North Carolina.
On May 29, 1961, plaintiff instituted an action against the defendant
in the proper federal court in Virginia. Service was made on the de-
fendant pursuant to the Virginia nonresident motorist statutes.2 The
1. 206 Va. 539, 145 S.E.2d 135 (1965).
2. VA. CoD- Amt., Sec. 8-67.1 (1950).
The acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred by article 6
(46-110 et seq.) of chapter 3 of Title 46 as evidenced by his operation, either in person
or by agent or employee, of a motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer hereunder, or the
operation by a nonresident, either in person or by an agent or employee, of a motor
vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer in this State otherwise than under such article, shall be
deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the Commissioner of the
Division of Motor Vehicles or his successors in office to be the true and lawful at-
torney of such nonresident upon whom may be served all lawful process against and
notice to such nonresident in any action or proceeding against him growing out of
any accident or collision in which such nonresident or his agent or employee may be
involved while operating a motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer in this Common-
wealth, and such acceptance or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that
any such process against or notice to him which is served shall be of the same legal
force and validity as if served upon him personally in the county or corporation in
which such accident or collision occurred or in which a resident defendant, if any,
resides.
The term 'nonresident' includes any person who though resident when the motor
vehicle accident or collision occurred, has been continuously outside the State for at
least sixty days next preceding the day on which notice or process is left with the
Commissioner.
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